브룩스 전 사령관 “평양 부근 시설, 미사일 조립시설 첩보와 일치”

미 전략국제문제연구소(CSIS)가 5일, 북한 평양 순안국제공항 인근 신리에 새로운 탄도미사일 지원 시설이 완공을 앞두고 있다며 공개한 위성사진. 지난 3월 21일 촬영했다. 사진 출처: CSIS / BEYOND PARALLEL.

최근 평양 부근에 새로운 탄도미사일 지원 시설이 완공을 앞두고 있다는 관측이 제기된 가운데, 빈센트 브룩스 전 한미연합사령관은 관련 내용이 북한의 대형 미사일 조립시설 건설 정황 첩보들과 일치한다고 말했습니다. 

빈센트 브룩스 전 한미연합사령관은 6일 VOA에 최근 전략국제문제연구소(CSIS)가 위성사진을 통해 분석한 평양 인근 신리 시설 관련 보고서에 대해, 미-한 당국이 파악해온 대형 미사일 종합제조시설 첩보들과 일치한다”고 밝혔습니다.

[녹취: 브룩스 전 사령관] “I won't comment on whether USFK knew about this specific facility but USFK was aware and so was the South Korea's Joint chiefs and Korea's Defense intelligence agencies were aware of facilities like this... We certainly had indications when I was in command in Korea that there were sites that had been created that allow for assembly of  larger ballistic missiles, the intermediate range and intercontinental ballistic missiles and  places to be covered so that wouldn't be visible but also to be able to assemble and erect the missiles…This recent analysis of the facility described certainly matches those characteristics.”

브룩스 전 사령관 “미한 당국, 북한의 종합미사일제조 시설들 사전 인지”

“중거리ㆍ대륙간탄도미사일 조립…TEL 장착 안정성 실험”

브룩스 전 사령관은 CSIS가 공개한 특정 시설에 대해 주한미군이 파악하고 있었는지 여부는 답변을 삼가하겠다고 말했습니다.

그러나 재직 당시 주한미군과 한국의 합참, 국방 정보당국은 대형미사일 종합 조립을 위한 시설들이 있다는 것을 인지하고 있었다며, 최근 CSIS가 공개한 정보는 이런 첩보들과 확실히 일치한다고 밝혔습니다.

브룩스 전 사령관은 이 시설들은 크기가 큰 탄도미사일인 중거리 미사일, 대륙간탄도미사일 등을 조립하면서 위성에 포착되지 않도록 은폐하는 동시에 이동형 차량에 탑재해 미사일 각도를 세울 수 있도록 하는 실험들을 제공한다고 덧붙였습니다.

“교착셈법ㆍ기만의도, 두가지 가능성 모두 살펴봐야”

“위협심화 의도일 경우, 대북 원점타격 겨냥도 지속”

브룩스 전 사령관은 북한의 의도에 대해, 그들이 주장하는 미국의 적대시 정책이 바뀌지 않았기 때문에 준비 상태를 바꾸지 않겠다는 것인지, 김정은 위원장이 약속한 적대시 철회가 거짓이었으며, 이번 공개를 통해 들통난 것인지 두 가지 가능성을 염두에 둬야한다고 말했습니다.

[녹취: 브룩스 전 사령관] “Is it because they feel that the hostile policy as they describe it has not changed and therefore their preparations should not change?...Are they lying about this? Has it been caught in the act? So these are really two different possibilities that have to be considered. And I think it would be important for North Korea to help people understand so that there's not a misunderstanding, or miscalculation by especially South Korea and the United States but also the international community.”

특히 이번 시설 공개로 북한의 진정성에 의구심을 제기하는 시각에 대해 놀랍지 않다며, 책임은 북한에 있으며, 미국, 한국 뿐 아니라 국제사회가 오판하지 않도록 규명하는 것은 북한의 몫이라고 강조했습니다.

브룩스 전 사령관은 만일 평화 대신 국제사회를 위협하는 능력 심화를 향해 전진하기 위한 행동이라면 미-한 당국이 파악하고 있는 모든 관련 시설에 대한 원점 타격 겨냥 역시 지속될 수 밖에 없다는 점을 북한은 잘 알아야한다고 밝혔습니다.

반면, 북한의 행동이 불신에 따른 현상유지를 고수하는 것이라면, 관련 시설 철폐 등 향후 행동에 따라 미-한 당국 역시 표적에 대한 겨냥 정책에서 물러설 수 있다는 점을 알아야 한다고 덧붙였습니다.

브룩스 전 사령관은 이번에 공개된 정보에 대해 과민반응을 하지 않으면서 북한에 명백히 하는 것이 중요하다고 밝혔습니다.

[녹취: 브룩스 전 사령관] “The goal here is to not overreact, rather to call it out and be clear about it. So I'm glad that it's in the public eye now, the CSIS report. And I hope North Korea takes stock of that and recognizes that the conditions they have created are increasing danger to them, not decreasing danger. And if the security guarantees are what they want, this is not the way to get them.”

북한이 조성하고 있는 조건들은 긴장완화 보다는 위험을 증가시키고 있으며, 이런 행동들은 그들이 요구하는 체제 안전보장을 얻기 위한 방법으로는 잘못됐다는 점을 깨닫길 바란다는 겁니다.

조셉 버뮤데즈 “탄도미사일 능력 지속확장 의미”

“비핵화 의제에 핵심 지원시설 관련 논의 포함돼야”

이번 보고서의 저자인 조셉 버뮤데즈 CSIS 선임연구원은 VOA에, 일부 한국 매체들이 관련 시설을 ‘대륙간탄도미사일 운용 기지’”로 잘못 인용했다고 말했습니다.

버뮤데즈 선임연구원은 실전 상황을 염두에 둔 미사일 운용 기지와 ‘지원 시설’의 의미는 엄격히 구분된다며, 이번 보고서는 대륙간탄도미사일뿐 아니라 모든 종류의 미사일 관련 무기의 조립, 보관, 훈련 가능성에 무게를 둔 ‘지원 시설’로 분석했다고 강조했습니다.

그러면서, 이번에 공개된 신리 탄도미사일 지원 시설이 갖는 중요한 의미는 북한이 탄도미사일 전략군의 능력을 지속적으로 확장하고 있다는 점이라고 밝혔습니다.

[녹취 : 버뮤데즈 선임연구원] “That is an excellent question. This facility clearly indicates that North Korea is continuing to not only maintain its ballistic missile force but is expanding capability with ballistic missiles…As such it would be hoped that ongoing talks between South Korea, North Korea and the United States and North Korea that this facility as well as others, those are considered in any discussions.”

버뮤데즈 선임연구원은 특히 복수의 대규모 탄도미사일 지원 시설이 북한 내에 더 있을 개연성을 배제할 수 없다고 말했습니다.

브루스 베넷 “고체연료 전환 실험 장소 사용 가능성”

“TEL 탑재 고체연료 미사일 무게ㆍ발사각 실험 연관”

브루스 베넷 랜드연구소 선임연구원은 보고서에서 분석한 중앙동의 높게 솟은 부분을 지적하며, 탄도미사일의 고체연료 전환 실험과 연계돼 있을 가능성이 높다고 말했습니다.

[녹취: 베넷 선임연구원] “For a solid fuel missile, you're raising not only the missile shell, you're raising the fuel. And that's far heavier. It's got to be stable while the missile is standing on the TEL... So they're going to want to be able to test putting this missile on the TEL”

액체연료 기반 스커드 미사일의 경우 이동형 차량에서 각도를 높인 뒤 연료를 주입하는 방식이라면, 고체연료 기반은 처음부터 연료가 주입돼 있기 때문에 미사일 각도를 세울 경우 이동형 차량이 중심 무게를 견딜 수 있는지 시험하는 과정이 필수적이라는 설명입니다.

이에 대해 버뮤데즈 선임연구원도 “관련 시설이 고체연료 기반 탄도미사일의 중심 무게 안정화 실험 장소로 사용될 개연성이 있다”고 말했습니다.

VOA뉴스 김동현입니다.

 

Sil-li Ballistic Missile Support Facility

Key Findings

• A new facility is nearing completion near Pyongyang International Airport that is almost certainly related to North Korea’s expanding ballistic missile program.
• A high-bay building within the facility is large enough to accommodate an elevated Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile and, therefore, the entirety of North Korea’s known ballistic missile variants.
• The facility has been constructed next to an underground facility whose likely size is also large enough to easily accommodate all known North Korean ballistic missiles and their associated launchers and support vehicles.

In a joint baseline analysis with Jane’s Intelligence Review, the Center for Strategic and International Studies surveys a previously undisclosed facility near Pyongyang  International Airport in North Korea that is likely related to its expanding ballistic missile development program.

Development

Since mid-2016, North Korea has undertaken the construction of a uniquely configured facility on the southwest corner of Pyongyang International Airport and approximately 17 kilometers northwest of the capital city of Pyongyang.1 Among the unique characteristics of this new facility are:

• Layout, configuration, and large size of the buildings
• Interconnected buildings designed for drive-through access
• Raised center section (i.e., a high-bay) on the largest building
• Large underground facility (UGF) adjacent to the facility
• Wide-radius road network connecting all the buildings and the UGF
• Unusually large covered rail terminal and new rail spur line
• Location relatively close to ballistic missile component manufacturing plants in the Pyongyang area

Taken as a whole, these characteristics suggest that this facility is likely designed to support ballistic missile operations and for the interim is identified as the Sil-li (신리) Ballistic Missile Support Facility. As such, it is another component of the North Korean ballistic missile infrastructure that has been undergoing both modernization and expansion during the past 10 years. While the precise function of the facility is unclear, its configuration and the size of its buildings and UGF indicate that it can be used for, the assembly of ballistic missiles from components delivered by rail from nearby ballistic missile component factories (e.g., Tae-sung Machine Factory, Mangyongdae Light Electric Factory), accommodate all known and anticipated North Korean ballistic missiles and their transporter-erector-launchers (TEL), mobile-erector-launchers (MEL) or transporter-erectors (TE) for depot-level maintenance, storage of ballistic missiles and their transporters, or any combination of these functions.

Overview image of the Sunan-up and Sil-li areas showing the locations of the airport and Sil-li Ballistic Missile Support Facility, April 15, 2020. (Courtesy of the European Space Agency)

Given the unfinished perimeter security wall, the continued presence of temporary construction buildings and storage units within the facility, the upcoming completion of nearby worker housing units, and the incomplete railroad spur line, the facility is undoubtedly not yet complete. If construction continues at its current pace, and barring unforeseen delays, it could be complete and ready for operations sometime during late-2020 or early-2021.

Description

Excluding the new housing units in the village of Sil-li, the facility encompasses approximately 442,300 square meters, including three large drive-through structures, a large adjacent drive-through UGF, and a covered rail terminal—all connected by a 9- to 10-meter-wide surfaced road network with wide radius turns suitable for the movement of large trucks and ballistic missile launchers.

Overview of Sil-li area and Sil-li Ballistic Missile Support Facility, March 21, 2020. (Copyright © 2020 by MAXAR Technologies)

Topographic map of the Sil-li Ballistic Missile Support Facility.

Sil-li Ballistic Missile Support Facility, March 21, 2020. (Copyright © 2020 by MAXAR Technologies)

The most visually distinctive features of the Sil-li facility are its three large interconnected drive-through buildings. The construction of which was begun around June 2017 with the leveling of the land and excavations in preparation for foundations. The pouring of the concrete foundations would begin the following month and was slowly followed by the erection of walls. By June 2018, all three buildings were externally complete and closed in. By August of 2018, the roads around connecting the buildings, and the UGF were paved and competed. Since that time, work likely has focused upon completion of the interior of the buildings.

Drive-through buildings under construction, November 18, 2017. (Copyright © 2020 by MAXAR Technologies)

The largest drive-through building measures approximately 122-meters-by-43-meters with an approximately 6-meter-wide bay door at either end. This building is connected to the two smaller buildings by two approximately 12-meter-wide passageways—one at each end. The few publicly available satellite images of the buildings during construction shows a predominantly wide-open floorplan with some workshop or office space along some of the longest sides. Although they will likely be installed, no bridge cranes were visible within the interior of the building during construction. Significantly, the building has a 37-meter-by-30-meter elevated center section (i.e., a high-bay) that is high enough to allow for a Hwasong-14 or Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) on a TEL to be easily elevated into the firing position to allow for testing of both, as well as the training of maintenance and ground crews.

High off-nadir view of the three externally complete drive-through buildings, June 22, 2019. (Copyright © 2020 by MAXAR Technologies)

The two smaller drive-through structures measure approximately 84-meters-by-42.5-meters each with an approximately 6-meter-wide bay door at either end. They are connected to each other by an 8-meter-wide passageway and, as noted above, are connected to the larger building by two large passageways. No bridge cranes were visible within the interior of either of the buildings during construction, although it is likely they will be installed.

Close-up view of the three externally complete drive-through buildings, March 21, 2020. (Copyright © 2020 by MAXAR Technologies)

All the bay doors and passageways on the three buildings are wide enough to accommodate all known North Korean ballistic missiles and their associated TELs, MELs, or TEs. By comparison, the two smaller buildings by themselves and the larger building by itself are larger than the horizontal processing building either at the Sohae Satellite Launch Facility or Tonghae Satellite Launch Facility.

The horizontal processing building at the Sohae Satellite Launch Facility. (Copyright © 2020 by MAXAR Technologies)

The horizontal processing building at the Tonghae Satellite Launch Facility. (Copyright © 2020 by MAXAR Technologies)

As construction of the main buildings commenced, several existing small support buildings directly to the northeast were appropriated and incorporated into the facility. There are no indications as to whether these will remain or be razed when construction is finished. Additionally, as the three main buildings were being closed in, an approximately 33-meter-by-76-meter parking apron was poured immediately to their west, along the main access road.

Construction of the covered rail terminal began during January 2018 and was externally complete by October 2019. The covered rail terminal itself measures approximately 180-meters-by-33-meters and consists of a loading/unloading track, engine runaround track, and 188-meter-by-12-meter platform.3 (The ramp extends out of the covered terminal.) It allows for the concealed loading and unloading of outsized loads. It is unknown whether a bridge crane has been, or will be, installed within the terminal to facilitate loading or unloading operations. This covered rail terminal is similar to those previously constructed at missile-related facilities such as the Sohae Satellite Launch Facility during 2015 and more recently at the Sinpo South Shipyard during 2017.4 Similarly, these terminals were also built to conceal loading and unloading operations for outsized loads. By November 2019, much of the roadbed for the 3.5-kilometer-long railroad spur line connecting to the Sunan Rail Station had been built, and the laying of ballast had begun. As of imagery acquired on March 21, 2020, approximately 2.3 kilometers of the new railroad spur line has had ballast and railroad ties (i.e., sleepers) laid, although no track has been placed.

Covered rail terminal under construction, June 22, 2019. (Copyright © 2020 by MAXAR Technologies Technologies)

Externally complete covered rail terminal, March 21, 2009. (Copyright © 2020 by MAXAR Technologies Technologies)

The covered rail terminal at the Sohae Satellite Launch Facility. (Copyright © 2020 by MAXAR Technologies)

The covered rail terminal at the Sinpo South Shipyard. (Copyright © 2020 by MAXAR Technologies)

Sometime during late-2019 and early-2020, a small building was erected west of the covered rail terminal. Its size and location suggest that it may serve as offices for a small facility guard force.

Another unique feature of the Sil-li facility is its construction adjacent to an existing UGF to which it is connected by its road network. This facility was built during the 1980s, perhaps earlier, to provide wartime protection for the aircraft and equipment of a fighter air regiment based at the Pyongyang International Airport tasked with the defense of Pyongyang. As the nationwide network of air facilities developed over the years, the air regiment was moved elsewhere, and the UGF was then used for general equipment and vehicle storage. It was then apparently abandoned until reactivated as part of the Sil-li facility. Although specific internal construction details of this UGF are unknown, using the little available information about North Korean UGFs, the topography in which it is located, and the layout of the Sil-li UGF’s entrances, it is likely that the primary tunnel is approximately 750-meters-long and 40-meters-wide, with 30-meter-wide entrances at both ends. Once again, large enough to easily accommodate all known North Korean ballistic missiles and their associated launchers and support vehicles.

The north UGF entrance with camouflage netting in place. March 21, 2020. (Copyright © 2020 by MAXAR Technologies)

An April 28, 2017 image of Kim Jong-un standing at the entrance of a UGF at the Pukchang-ni Airbase prior to the test launch of a Hwasong-12 ICBM provides some perspective of how large these aircraft UGFs are and how a TEL fits within them.

The entrance to the underground facility at the Beijing Air and Space Museum is similar in size and design to North Korean aviation UGFs. (Copyright © 2020 by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.)

Kim Jong-un standing at the entrance of a UGF at the Pukchang-ni Airbase prior to the test launch of a Hwasong-12 ICBM. In the background, inside the UGF, the Hwasong-12 can be seen on its TEL prior to launch, April 28, 2017. (Source: KCTV)

During 2018, the construction of a security wall around the facility was begun. This wall not only encompassed the new buildings but, when finished, will run along the ridgeline above the UGF.5 As this wall was being erected, construction of a new road running along its outside perimeter was begun to allow for movement around the new facility. As of imagery acquired on March 21, 2020, this road was still under construction.

New road under construction running along the outside of the security wall, March 21, 2020. (Copyright © 2020 by MAXAR Technologies)

It was in the small village of Sil-li, during August 2016, that the first indications of the construction of the facility were identified. At this time, much of the eastern section of the village was razed, and construction began on what would become a new housing facility for staff, engineers, and workers at the Sil-li facility. Approximately six months later, an additional section on the south side of the village was razed, and the construction of a second housing facility was begun. As construction of these housing facilities progressed, additional sections of the original village were razed. As of imagery acquired on March 21, 2020, much of the original village has been razed, and a total of 31 new multi-story housing units have been completed or are under construction in the two housing areas.

The east housing facility showing 15 complete three-story housing units and 2 additional units under construction, March 21, 2020. (Copyright © 2020 by MAXAR Technologies)

The west housing facility showing 15 complete three-story housing units and 2 three-story housing units under construction, March 21, 2020. (Copyright © 2020 by MAXAR Technologies)

At a macro level, the Sil-li Ballistic Missile Support Facility is served by both paved roads and the national railroad system—through the dedicated rail spur line that connects to the Sunan-up rail station. Aside from the Pyongyang International Airport, the nearest operational military air facility is Sunchon Airbase, 32 kilometers to the northeast. There are at least 17 air defense artillery bases and numerous military and paramilitary barracks within a 5-kilometer radius of the plant. Additionally, the plant is covered by 17 S-75 (SA-2 Guideline), 6 S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa), and at least one S-200 (SA-5 Gammon) surface-to-air missile bases.

Research Note

This report, as are the others in this series, is based upon an ongoing study of the Korean People’s Army ballistic missile infrastructure by the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

 

Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. is an internationally recognized analyst, award-winning author, and lecturer on North Korean defense and intelligence affairs and ballistic missile development in developing countries. He is concurrently senior fellow for Imagery Analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Security (CSIS); senior adviser and imagery analyst for the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK); author for IHS Markit (formerly the Jane’s Information Group); and publisher and editor of KPA Journal. Formerly, he has served as founder and CEO of KPA Associates, LLC, senior imagery analyst for 38 North at Johns Hopkins SAIS, chief analytics officer and co-founder of AllSource Analysis, Inc., and senior all-source analyst for DigitalGlobe’s Analysis Center. 

https://beyondparallel.csis.org/sil-li-ballistic-missile-support-facility/?utm_source=Members&utm_campaign=b83fd97af7-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_01_12_COPY_04&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_e842221dc2-b83fd97af7-

Sil-li Ballistic Missile Support Facility - Beyond Parallel